加拿大岸桥倒塌事故调查︱港口装卸机械

加拿大交通安全运输委员会发布了Ever Summit轮于去年在温哥华Vanterm码头碰撞岸桥事故的详细调查报告，突显了对法规的需求，其中包括岸边集装箱起重机海侧轨道的安全距离。

The investigation into a vessel hitting a crane at the Vanterm terminal highlights a need for regulations that include the safe setback of the waterside rail for STS cranes.

加拿大运输安全委员会（TSB）已发布其调查报告，内容涉及2019年1月在温哥华Vanterm集装箱码头发生的事故。7,024 TEU的Ever Ever集装箱船舶在引水员的指导下停泊，并协助两个拖船，与港口的一台岸边集装箱起重机接触。起重机的前大梁坍塌到船上，随后将岸边集装箱起重机报废。下面根据对去年“长荣旗下经营的这一艘集装箱船撞击岸桥致吊臂坍塌”这一事故的详细报道，来剖析此类事故发生的原因和风险。
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) has released its investigation report into an accident at Vancouver’s Vanterm terminal in January 2019. While berthing under the direction of a pilot, and with two tugs assisting, the 7,024 TEU vessel Ever Summit made contact with one of the port’s STS cranes. The boom of the crane collapsed on to the vessel and the crane was subsequently written off.

Ever Summit于2007年在日本的三菱重工建造，是长荣海运公司的10艘系列姊妹船之一。事故发生时，该船正在跨太平洋航线上服务，Ever Summit计划于2019年1月28日0600左右在Vanterm(温哥华港口的一个集装箱码头)停靠。当时该船载有3462个集装箱，在甲板以上堆放了8层。船的吃水最深的是船尾，有13.70米。



发现引水员错误是造成事故的原因。该船于1月27日抵达不列颠哥伦比亚省维多利亚市附近的引航站，船员们对导航设备、机械、舵机和尾部推进器进行了测试，准备对接。22时40分，引水员登船后和船长确认了有关船舶的信息和细节后告知船长该船将靠右舷5号和6号泊位。调查确定，在船只接近后，Ever Summit撞到了泊位，引水员无意中给了辅助拖船相反的指示，与停泊操纵期间的意图相反。” 引水员在停泊期间看不到拖船，“他依靠自己的记忆和操纵的心理模型来跟踪拖船的位置和运动。引水员按字母顺序排列了拖船，以便于记住每个拖船的位置。然而，在机动操作本身（这是信息处理工作量很大的时期）期间，他无意间混淆了他们的位置，并给了他们相反的指示。”Pilot error was found to be the cause of the accident. “The investigation determined that the Ever Summit struck the berth after the vessel made a close approach and that the pilot inadvertently gave the assisting tugs the opposite instructions from what was intended during the berthing manoeuvre”. The pilot could not see the tugs during the berthing “was relying on his memory and mental model of the manoeuvre to keep track of the location and movements of the tugs. The pilot had lined up the tugs alphabetically to make it easier to remember each tug’s position; however, during the manoeuvre itself, which is a time of high information processing workload, he inadvertently mixed up their positions and gave them the opposite instructions.”
引水员和拖船都使用channel 17频道进行通信。大约在0343分，他们在该频道上遇到一些干扰后，改用另一个工作频道。此时，Ever Summit号正以几乎平行航向接近泊位，距离泊位约10米。两台码头桥吊（3号桥吊和5号桥吊机）位于泊位的最西部（约600米处），三台桥吊位于泊位中部（约300米处），最后一台桥吊位于东部（约80米处）。
0359分，在距离桥面与桥标线还有约200米时，引水员下令将船速降至1节以下。为了抵消因降速而导致的船尾向泊位的预期靠拢，引水员开始给拖船发指令，而他在右舷的位置看不到拖船。
前拖船Seaspan Falcon接到指示要拉紧揽绳，船尾开始向泊位倾斜。随后，Seaspan Falcon得到指示将拉力增加到最大，船尾拖轮Seaspan Hawk得到指示将推力增到最大。这导致船的尾部迅速向泊位移动，船长试图提醒引水员，引水员立刻使用船头推进器，并向右推满舵。
4时01分，在拖船仍以最大功率运行的情况下，Ever Summit 号的船尾撞上了泊位，并与5号桥吊接触。5号桥吊的台架向码头方向倒塌，吊臂落在船上。撞击时，船舶与泊位面成约10度角。撞击发生后，引水员下令停车和关停了船首侧推，并指示拖船停止作业。引水员还命令船只放下左锚，并指示拖轮将船只固定在适当位置。


当码头桥吊吊臂落到船上时，最上层大约6个集装箱被损坏。 在该船的右舷后壳板上穿了一个约30 cm x 40 cm的洞。 壳板向内凹陷，长度8米，凹陷深度6 cm。 右舷侧的外壳板可见到擦痕，划痕和油漆变色。 码头泊位的船舶作业中断了大约8天。5号码头桥吊被宣布为全损，3号码头桥吊受到轻微损坏。此外，5号码头桥吊下面的大量牵引挂车被损坏。

该调查研究了停泊期间与拖船的通信，Vantterm大型集装箱船泊位基础设施的适用性以及码头的整体风险管理。该报告突出了一个问题，即船只尺寸的增加逐渐减少了安全靠泊和船只在Vanterm上撞到岸边集装箱起重机之间的安全余量，直至出现错误的可能性很小。

 The investigation looked at communications with tugs during berthing, the suitability of the berth infrastructure for large container vessels at Vanterm, and overall risk management of the terminal. The report highlights a problem where the increase in vessel size has progressively whittled down the margin between safe berthing and a vessel hitting a crane at Vanterm to the point where there is very very little room for error.



导致或促成此次事故的条件、行为或安全缺陷如下：

1.集装箱船尺寸不断扩大，而码头设施却没有相应升级在过去的10年里，靠泊集装箱船的尺寸不断增加，而码头却没有相应的升级。因此，这给大型集装箱船的靠泊带来了新的危险，因为它们在完全侧向靠泊时更容易出现小偏差。这种偏差可能会导致船壳对护舷系统施加过多的力，以及船的悬垂部分会与泊位或相近的码头桥吊接触，而且随着水位增高这些风险会变大。当前，该港口没有任何独立机构（例如港口当局或加拿大运输部），就码头停靠的船舶尺寸进行定期检查或审核泊位的适用性。

2.该船在离泊位约10米处靠泊，造成在靠泊过程中应对任何偏差的反应时间不足 对于Ever Summit，该公司的指导意见建议该船在离泊位至少1.5个船宽(64米)的地方平行停靠，然后用拖船横向推入。然而，该船仅距离岸边10米，这限制了靠泊操纵期间对任何偏差做出反应的时间。根据船长的经验，引航员以低于规定距离靠泊是很常见的，他并没有表示担忧。

3.引水员给出了错误指令

拖轮通常用于协助大型集装箱船舶靠泊，其使用可能会因各种因素而变得复杂，例如使用中的拖轮数量、引水员是否能看到拖轮以及靠泊操纵的复杂程度。拖轮的使用程序很大程度上由引水员个人自行决定，而且没有标准协议和做法。在Ever Summit的案例中，引水员视线受阻，无法看见拖轮的具体位置，引水员依靠自己的记忆来记住拖船的位置和移动。然而，在操作过程中，他无意中混淆了他们的位置，给了他们相反的指令。

4.船长和驾驶台小组没有监测到引水员对拖船的错误指令

在靠泊操作期间，船长和驾驶台小组依靠引水员操纵船舶驶入泊位，主要精力放在监测船舶的位置和执行引水员的命令上，没有密切监视引水员对拖船发出的命令，因而无法及时认识到不断恶化的情况。

5.该船本身的发动机、推进器等进行纠正的效果不足，致船尾以与泊位线成10度撞到码头，速度约为0.4节。且由于该船悬垂部分较大，且码头桥吊距离泊位线较近，导致船体撞到了泊位和桥吊，且吊臂砸在集装箱上。

一直以来（追溯至2012年或更早），人们对Vanterm和不列颠哥伦比亚省其他码头的护舷系统容量感到担忧。2015年，太平洋引水员协会（PPA）聘请了一名顾问，以评估停靠在卑斯省港口的最大集装箱船的风险。

 There have been ongoing concerns (going back to 2012 and earlier) about the capacity of the fendering system at Vanterm, and other terminals in British Colombia. In 2015 the Pacific Pilots Association (PPA) engaged a consultant to assess the risks of berthing the largest container vessels calling at BC ports.

“咨询报告于2016年完成，得出的结论是，温哥华现有集装箱泊位的船舶间距标准，加上这些泊位上的护舷板的能力，意味着温哥华的运营风险要高于某些可比港口。该报告指出，温哥华的可接受间距不仅比大多数国家都更紧密，而且安装的护舷系统的容量要求更高的靠泊精度。报告指出，除非采取措施降低风险，否则这些因素有可能随着较大船只的到来而增加停泊事件的数量。”

 “The consultant’s report, completed in 2016, concluded that the existing standards of ship spacing on container berths in Vancouver, combined with the capacity of the fenders on these berths, meant that Vancouver was operating at a higher degree of risk than some comparable ports. The report noted that not only is Vancouver’s acceptable spacing tighter than most, but also the capacity of the fitted fenders requires a higher degree of precision in berthing. The report indicated that these factors have the potential to increase the number of berthing incidents with the arrival of larger vessels unless measures are taken to mitigate the risk,” the TSB noted.

实际上，停泊事件的数量正在增加。2013年发生了四起事件，船只与Vanterm护舷系统的护目镜接触”。在2009年1月至2020年7月之间，TSB收到了20起事件的报告，这些事件涉及在温哥华港集装箱码头的靠泊处/靠泊处对船舶或岸上基础设施的破坏。其中有13处发生在Vanterm，只有2处发生在Deltaport，尽管Vanterm每年平均靠泊196艘船只，而Deltaport则为291艘。在2019年1月的Ever Summit事件之后，Ever Shine的姊妹船之一在Vanterm上撞了起重机4月5日。

The number of berthing incidents was in fact increasing. There were four incidents in 2013 where vessels “made contact with eye pads on Vanterm’s fendering system”. Between January 2009 and July 2020, the TSB received reports of 20 occurrences involving damage to vessels or shore infrastructure during berthing/unberthing at container terminals within the Port of Vancouver. 13 of these occurred at Vanterm, and just two at Deltaport, despite Vanterm averaging 196 vessel calls per year compared to Deltaport’s 291. Following the Ever Summit incident in January 2019, one of its sister ships, the Ever Shine struck a crane at Vanterm on 5 April.

Vanterm起重机的后退意味着与其他码头相比，其岸边起重机在停泊事件中被船撞的风险更大。从起重机轨道到Vanterm的泊位前部的距离仅为2.13m，“这意味着即使停泊在船上即使是很小的角度，也可能导致船首或船尾的喇叭口与起重机接触。在附近”。

The set back of the cranes at Vanterm meant its cranes were at a greater risk of bring struck by vessel in a berthing incident than other terminals. The distance from the crane rail to the front of the berth at Vanterm is just 2.13m, “which means that even a slight angle on a vessel while berthing could cause the flare of its bow or stern to come into contact with a crane if one is in the vicinity”.



事件发生时，Ever Summit的最大悬空为313万。船舶撞上起重机时，与泊位面成大约10°角进入泊位。

The maximum overhang of the Ever Summit at the time of the incident was found to be 3.13m. The vessel came into berth at an angle of approximately 10° from the berth face when it hit the crane.

即使在很小的角度下，起重机也很脆弱。对TSB进行的模拟发现，“在低潮时，船体设计和干舷高度与Ever Ever山顶相似，且负载中等至满载，航向角会从平行方向向泊位收敛或发散更多。超过3°时，船体的一部分将与靠泊面接触。在高水位时，这些角度减小到1.5°“。

Even at a very slight angle the cranes were vulnerable. Simulations performed for the TSB found that “at low tide, for a vessel with a hull design and freeboard height similar to the Ever Summit with a moderate-to-full load, heading angles that either converge or diverge from parallel to the berth by more than 3° create a situation where a portion of the vessel’s hull will make contact with the berth face. At high water, these angles are reduced to 1.5°".

自从Ever Summit事件以来，GCT已对Vanterm的护舷系统进行了升级，但其起重机仍然异常靠近码头。该报告指出，Deltaport的后退量为696万，并引用《港口设计师手册》，建议后退量不少于3m，对于处理大型集装箱船的大型泊位，建议后退量不低于7.5m。

Since the Ever Summit incident GCT has upgraded the fenders at Vanterm, but its cranes remain unusually close to the quay face. The report notes that the set back at Deltaport is 6.96m, and cites a “port Designer’s Handbook” that recommends a set back of not less than 3m, and “around 7.5m” for large berths handling large container vessels.

但是，没有任何法规要求会迫使Vanterm和温哥华弗雷泽港务局升级Vanterm的泊位和起重机轨道。“目前没有任何独立机构（如港口当局或加拿大运输部）就定期检查或审核泊位与在码头停泊的最大船舶尺寸和泊位过程有关的适用性提出要求。这导致管理这种风险的负担转移给了船长和引水员，他们面临的挑战是停泊大型集装箱船，其容错能力持续降低。此外，Vanterm没有安装泊位辅助系统，该系统可以在泊位的关键阶段提供有价值的实时信息。”

There is, however, no regulatory requirement that would compel Vanterm and the Vancouver Fraser Port Authority to upgrade the berth and crane rails at Vanterm. “There are currently no requirements in place for any independent body, such as a port authority or Transport Canada, to periodically examine or audit the suitability of a berth in relation to the maximum size of vessels berthing at a terminal and the berthing process. This has resulted in the burden of managing this risk being shifted to the master and pilot, who are left with the challenge of berthing large container vessels with a tolerance for error that continues to decrease. Additionally, Vanterm is not fitted with a berthing aid system that can provide valuable real-time information during the critical stages of berthing,” the report said.

电信标准化局结束了对大型船舶的安全隐患未得到充分关注的持续关注，从而结束了调查。“随着停靠温哥华港的集装箱船的规模不断增加，并且由于技术合作部或温哥华弗雷泽港务局对泊位的适用性缺乏任何监督，委员会担心船只的尺寸可能会增加。超过了温哥华港的码头基础设施容量，无法安全容纳它们。”

The TSB ended its investigation with its ongoing concern that the safety risk from large vessels is not being adequately addressed. “As the size of container vessels calling at the Port of Vancouver continues to increase and, given the absence of any oversight as to the suitability of the berths by TC or the Vancouver Fraser Port Authority, the Board is concerned that the size of vessels may exceed the Port of Vancouver’s terminal infrastructure capacity to accommodate them safely."






免责声明：本文来源于网络，仅代表作者个人观点，与港口装卸机械公众号无关。其原创性以及文中陈述文字和内容未经本站证实，对本文以及其中全部或者部分内容、文字的真实性、完整性、及时性本站不作任何保证或承诺，请读者仅作参考，并请自行核实相关内容。如涉及作品版权问题，请与我们联系，我们将根据您提供的版权证明材料确认版权。

更多请点击 阅读原文